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19137

Defendant/Respondent.
IUTURE OF CASH

This is an action for breach of a written contract for social
services.

STATEMKNT OF FACTS:
On December 23,

1982, the parties entered into a contract for

personal services whereby Plaintiff /Appellant was to provide social services
in 1983 for certain troubled youth as part of the services requested by a
contract which the Defendant/Respondent had with the State of Utah.

The

contract provided that Plaintiff/Appellant would be paid a total of Twentyfour Thousand Dollars ($24,000) as he performed services at the rate of Fifty
Dollars ($50) per hour, but not to exceed Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) in
any one ( 1) month, but if not paid that much in any month the difference was
to accumulate so he would be paid a total of Eighteen Thousand Dollars
($18,000) by June 30, 1983, if he was ready, willing and able to provide the

requested services in that amount in the first half of 1983 and Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000) by December 31,
requirement.

1983,

subject to the same availability

Difficulties insued as a result of the Defendant/Respondent not

requesting any services of the Plaintiff/Appellant prior to the termination of
the contract by Defendant/Respondent letter of February 10,

1983, except for

two (2) assignments (Findings of Fact Nos. 2 and 3) which involved a total of
five (5) hours of services (see Findings of Fact No. 5).

In connection with

an advance of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1, 500) made by Defendant/
Respondent to Plaintiff/Appellant on January 10,
assignment was made,

1983,

when the first

the Plaintiff /Appellant made an unauthorized phone call

to a state official requesting that the State advance certain monies to the
Defendant/Respondent (Findings of Fact No. 3).
specified in Findings of fact,

On January 25, 1983, (date not

but no dispute in evidence as to when it

occurred) Plaintiff/Appellant met with one Steve Trotter,

a youth for which

the Defendant/Respondent had responsibility without first contacting said
youth's home parent or assigned social worker (Findings of Fact No. 6).
January 31,

1983,

On

Defendant/Respondent requested Plaintiff /Appellant to move

into an interior office in the buildings where both parties had their offices
at 9136 South State Street and Plaintiff/Appellant refused to do so (he
contended his contract did not require it and it would be too expensive to
move all his furniture).

(See Findings of Fact No. 4.)

Without making any

express conclusion of law that the above acts of Defendant breached the
contract in question or that the breaches were material so as to warrant
termination of the contract the Court concluded that "Defendant justifiably
terminated 'for cause' the December 1982 contract with Plaintiff."
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DISPOSITION BELOW
After a bench trial on the merits, the lower Court concluded that
Defendants terminated the subject contract for cause and denied any relief to
Plaintiff for breach of contract or for anticipatory breach of contract.

RELIEF SOUGHT 011 APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the lower
Court's conclusion that the subject contract was terminated for cause and to
remand the case to the lower Court to ascertain the amount of judgment that
should be entered in favor of Plaintiff /Appellant and against Defendant/
Respondent since Defendant/Respondent has failed, negleted, and refused to pay
the Twenty-two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500) balance due on the
contract for services to be performed prior to January 1, 1984, less the
appropriate offset due to mitigation or costs saved from not fulfilling the
services Plaintiff /Appellant was obligated to perform if asked to do so.

POIRT I

THE PARTIAL BREACHES OF COllTRACT, IF ARY, SET FORTH Ill THE TRIAL COURT'S
FillDillGS OF FACT WERK ROT SO MATERIAL AS TO WARRAllT THE LOWER COURT Ill
TKRMIBATillG THE COITRACT Ill QUESTION
Section 241 of the second Restatement of Contract sets forth the
applicable principle in such cases.

It reads as follows:

Section 241 Circumstances Significant in Determining
Whether a Failure is Material
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer
performance is material, the following circumstances are
significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
3

{b) the extent to which the injured party can be
adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of
which he will be deprived;
{c)
the extent to which the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d)
the likelihood that the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure,
taking account of all the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with
standards of good faith and fair dealing.
In the case of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association vs.
Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co.,

325 P2d 899 ( 1958) this Court cited the first

Restatment of Contracts, Section 274 and 313 with favor.

In that case the

opinion on this point reads as follows:
Furthermore, it is a recognized principle of
contract law that a breach of an insubstantial nature,
which is severable and does not vi tally change the
transaction, does not release the other party completely
from performing his obligations under the contract, but
gives rise to a right for damages for any loss occasioned
thereby. This $2,000 was allowed as an offset in favor
of Cassady and Hartford and that is all they are entitled
to. (Footnote omitted).
In the instant case none of the breaches of contract, if in fact
they were breaches of contract, were substantial, all were minor and certainly
did not vitally change the transaction which was a contract to render social
services.

These conclusions find support in the following facts taking each

arguable breach in the order of the Court's findings.
Phone calls of January 10, 1983 to Russ Van Vleet (R58, Findings of
Fact No. 3).

Although the Court cited the protion of the contract which

prohibited Plaintiff/Appellant from any conduct which

would "tend to

complicate or otherwise negatively effect services relationship with said
4

department" thus implying that this call violated that provision,

the Court

dld not make any express finding to that effect and the testimony of the
Defendant/Respondent's director, Kent Burke, was to the contrary.

When he was

asked, "Did Mr. Van Vleet say anything to you that would indicate that that
was creating an adversary relationship between you and the State of Utah," he
responded, "he thought it was very strange that Layne would be calling about
that,

yes."

(T.4)

Furthermore,

Mr.

Burke admitted testifying in his

deposition that, "I didn't remember the telephone call."

(T.5)

Reguest of January 31, 1983 to Move Offices (R.59, Findings of Fact
No.4).

Nothing in the contract required Plaintiff/Appellant to work at any

particular location much less in a particular office.
that it did.

The Court did not find

In fact the finding in question faults Plaintiff /Appellant for

renting space already rented by Defendant/Respondent, an issue which is
collateral to the contract in question.
Home Parent/Foster Parent Manual Submitted January 22, 1983 (R.59
Finding No. 5.)

Here again the Trial Court makes no finding that the manual

in question failed to meet contract specifications.

In fact, the contract did

not require Plaintiff/Appellant to produce any such manual although the
assignment was a proper one and within the general scope of the work required
by the contract (R. 4 and 5.)

This finding merely established the fact that

Plaintiff/Appellant could receive at most Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250)
under the contract and he had not earned the balance of the One Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars
assignment.

($1,500) advance

he had received at the time of the

Plaintiff/Appellant has never claimed that he had earned the One

Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,250) difference, but only that he was
guaranteed sufficient work to earn the contract total of Twenty-four Thousand
5

Dollars ($24,000).

The fact that he elected not to "reinvent the wheel," but

to use another's work product that he had compiled caused no injury to
Defendant/Respondent,

but actually gave i t the means of providing that much

more social services for the youth for whom the state had contracted.
(Ex. P-10.)
Appellant's Meeting With Steve Trotter

( R.60,

Finding

No.

6.)

Plaintiff/Appellant took this young man to breakfast after learning he was not
going to school and was unsupervised.

He did that after he was unable to

contact the boy's parents and the social worker

assigned to that boy.

His

testimony that he had permission of Defendant/Respondent's director to contact
the youth under the agency's program was uncontradicted.

After being told no

contact should be made without express parental or social worker permission,
he did not do so but was frustrated by not having been given any assignments
by the social worker in question.

No claim is made that this contact with

this boy had any actual or even potentially detrimental consequences.
Whether

taken

individually or in their entirety,

these four

incidents certainly did not involve the main purpose of the contract,
delivery of social services to troubled youth.

to wit

In fact, Plaintiff /Appellant's

eagerness to perform the work which constituted to reason for the contract
seems to have been a source of friction between the parties.

(See Exhibits

"P 14-P 26 • ")
Plaintiff/Appellant submits that the foregoing shows that
circumstances

(a)

as

applied

to

the

facts

of

this

case

favors

Plaintiff/Appellant.
As for

circumstance

(b),

it

seems clear

that

any

breach by

Plaintiff /Appellant would be adequately compensated in damages and could
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simply be witheld from the Twenty-two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500)
yet due in his
Circumstance (c) is the single most critical factor in this
particular case as the hardship upon Plaintiff /Appellant of losing Twenty-two
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500) is most disproportionate to the minor
breaches and any injury caused Defendant/Respondent by them.
As for circumstance (d),

there is no dispute that Plaintiff/

Appellant was at all times ready, willing and able to perform the work
assigned to him and was pressing Defendant/Respondent for assignments.

(Ex.

P-19, P-23, P-26.)
As for circumstance (e), the behavior of Plaintiff /Appellant should
be classified as innocent as to the phone call to Russ Van Vleet, in compiling
the parenting manual and in taking Steve Trotter to breakfast.

His refusal to

move his office was willful, but within his rights as the contract was one of
an independent contractor not one of employment.

In short, he did act in good

faith and met the standards of fair dealing.
Circumstance ( f),

would favor relief on appeal as Defendant/

Respondent has control of Plaintiff/Appellant's performance in that payment
under the contact is made as services are rendered.
The most applicable comment from case precedent which Plaintiff/
Appellant has found is his from M & W Development Inc. vs. El Paso Water Co.
634 P2d 166 (Kansas app., 1981).

It reads as follows:

The record contains substantial competent evidence to
support the trial judge's finding that El Paso breached
the contract by not issuing notes to M & W. We cannot
say, however, that "material breach" justifying
rescission of the contract has occurred, as was concluded
by the trial judge.
What justifies rescission of a
contract was considered in In re Estate of Johnson, 202
7

Kan. 684, 691 92, 452 P.2d 286 (1969),
Supreme Court commented:

wherein the

"The right to rescind a contract is extreme and
does not necessarily arise from every breach.
To warrant rescission, the breach must be material and the failure to perform so substantial
as to defeat the object of the parties in
making the agreement. A breach which goes to
only a part of the consideration, which is
incidental and subordinate to the main purpose
of a contract, does not warrant a rescission.
(Baron vs. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 18 P .2d 137; 17
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts Section 504; 17A C.J.S.,
Contracts Section 422 ( 1); Corbin on Contracts
Section 1104.)" (Emphasis supplied.)

COICLUSIOll
This case should be remanded to the lower Court to enter judgment in
favor of Plaintiff /Appellant in against Defendant/Respondent for the contract
balance less income received by Plaintiff/Appellant for like services rendered
other or which should have been rendered to others in mitigation of damages
during the contract period.
Respectfully submitted this

{pf{ day of September, 1983.

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff /Appellant
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